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The Policy Choices and Reaction Functions of
Bank of England MPC Members
Mark N. Harris* and Christopher Spencer{{
The results of an econometric exercise are presented, showing that Monetary Policy Committee
(MPC) members appointed from outside the ranks of Bank of England staff (outsiders) react
differently to forecasts of inflation and output than those appointed from within the Bank
(insiders). All results are reinforced by the well-established findings that, compared with
outsiders, insiders choose higher interest rates, are more likely to vote as a bloc, and feature on
the winning side of policy decisions more frequently. On the basis of these results, it is argued
that the current MPC framework is biased toward the policy choices of insiders.
JEL Classification: E50, E60
1. Introduction
In May 1997 decisions on UK monetary policy were delegated to a Monetary Policy
Committee (MPC), and in a move toward transparency, a decision to publish the voting record
shortly after each meeting was taken. Releasing such information into the public domain has
focused parliamentary, financial, and news media interest on the voting behavior of individual
MPC members, who are mandated with hitting a government-set inflation target. Split
decisions constitute stories in themselves,1 and it is commonplace to draw attention to
differences in votes cast by members appointed from within and outside the ranks of Bank of
England staff (hereafter referred to as ‘‘insiders’’ and ‘‘outsiders,’’ respectively).
In this paper, it is demonstrated that a member’s type—which here refers to the insider-
outsider distinction—has a substantial bearing on the policy choices of MPC members. As in
previous work (Gerlach-Kristen 2003), insiders can (still) be construed as behaving more
‘‘conservatively’’ than outsiders, choosing higher interest rates. Furthermore, the extent to
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which each group engages in bloc voting is evidenced, confirming the suggestion that whereas
insiders vote as a ‘‘cohesive homogeneous group’’ (Edmonds 1999) outsiders are less inclined to
do so.2 Descriptive statistics show that insiders are also more likely to find themselves on the
winning side of a policy decision and are less likely to vote to change the interest rate. These
simple results reinforce the outcome of an econometric exercise suggesting that insiders and
outsiders have different reaction functions: Although the inflation forecast (expressed as a
deviation from target inflation) is a highly significant factor in driving votes to change the
interest rate across both groups, insiders and outsiders differ in their responses to these
deviations; furthermore, the role of real output growth forecasts (expressed in deviation form
from assumed potential output growth) play, at best, a negligible role in determining insiders’
and outsiders’ voting decisions. Finally, the effect of past voting behavior and policy decisions
on current behavior is more pronounced for outsiders, whereas the effect of different MPC
chairmen is insignificant for both groups. Findings are based on voting data contained in the
Minutes of Monthly Meetings from June 1997–May 2006, a period characterized by 109
meetings in which 955 votes were cast. It covers the first nine years of the MPC, encompassing
the entire period for which the MPC was chaired by Eddie George, and the first three years of
meetings under his successor, Mervyn King.
In light of the findings presented here, it is suggested that the MPC is characterized by a
structure that leads to insiders dominating decisions. This is nomoot point. Although the presence
of outsiders is designed to ensure that ‘‘the MPC benefits from thinking and expertise in addition
to that gained inside the Bank,’’3 such perceived benefits can in practice be limited if the structure
of the MPC is such that a single group within the committee is able to systematically dominate
interest rate decisions. Consequently, the benefits to UKmonetary policy from delegating interest
rate decisions to a committee are not being fully realized—that is, if one assumes the rationale for
establishing a MPC is to engender policy decisions that reflect a heterogeneity of views.
2. Rationalizing MPC Voting
There are strong reasons to suppose that the voting behavior of insiders and outsiders will
differ. First, as members of the same organization, insiders could have more of an incentive to
agree with each other at MPC meetings: Voting against one’s peers might be perceived as
detrimental to future career advancement.4 For this reason, it might be predicted that insiders
will vote together as a group. Outsiders might not face similar pressure given they emanate
from a wide array of different organizations. Buiter (1999) also suggests insiders’ votes might
reflect an organizational consensus or ‘‘Bank’’ view. Second, members within each group may
hold different beliefs about the macroeconomic effect of the timing of decisions, a view
supported by the publication of the Minutes in the ‘‘Tactical considerations’’ and ‘‘Immediate
policy decision’’ sections. On this view, insiders and outsiders might share the same policy
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2 ‘‘. . . on the face of it most of the five internal members seem to vote together, almost as a bloc’’ (House of Lords 1999).
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4 Members’ votes are here described as policy choices as opposed to policy preferences. As one anonymous referee has
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to ‘‘fall into line’’ with other MPC members (e.g., because of career concerns), thereby voting for a policy that would
not otherwise have been chosen.
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objective (i.e., to hit a government inflation target) but try to achieve it in different ways. Third,
different members may base their voting decisions on different information sets: For example,
outsiders might attach less importance than insiders to forecasts generated by the Bank’s suite
of in-house forecasting models. There is evidence to corroborate this view: Sushil Wadhwani
(2002) suggests that during his time as an MPC outsider, the Bank models incorporated ‘‘too
pessimistic’’ a view about the level of potential output; Wallis (2002) suggests that the Bank’s
quarterly inflation projections systematically overpredicted future inflation, a fact that is also
recognized in theMinutes for August 2000 (p. 9). ;If other outsiders held similar opinions and if
one assumes that insiders were more wed to the Bank’s in-house forecasts, it might be predicted
that of the two groups, outsiders would ceteris paribus vote for lower interest rates.
Some of the arguments cited above have been used to account for findings in the literature that
examine MPC voting behavior.5 Gerlach-Kristen (2003) shows that disagreements between
members of the Bank’s MPC are typically the rule and not the exception. Between June 1997 and
April 2003, insiders dissented far less frequently than outsiders, and whereas insiders dissented
overwhelmingly on the side of monetary tightness, outsiders did so on the side of monetary ease.
According to one argument, outsiders might attempt to raise their public profile by dissenting, in
that it attracts media attention. By contrast, insiders might not only dissent less because of an
organizational consensus, as in Buiter (1999)—which could promote bloc voting and voting against
the majority less frequently—but disagreeing with one’s colleagues on the MPC might hamper
career prospects at the Bank. This view can be traced back to, for example, Havrilesky and
Schweitzer (1990), who propose that the presence of career concerns is an important factor
determining the decision to dissent on the U.S. Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC). In this
sense, the way a member ‘‘performs’’ on the MPC is not just measured as their ability to hit an
inflation target, so to speak, but judged according to their propensity to agree with members of his
or her type. Building on this work, Harris and Spencer (2008) investigate the effect of MPC
members’ career backgrounds and experiences on dissent voting. Econometric estimates suggest
that career effects are negligible, with the largest determinant of a member’s decision to dissent
being their type. Another strand of MPC literature has exploited the heterogeneity in members’
votes to predict future monetary policy decisions (Gerlach-Kristen 2004) and shed light on the
factors underlying MPC decision making (Bhattacharjee and Holly 2004). In both contributions,
information contained in the voting record increases the predictability of monetary policy decisions.
The MPC’s reaction function has also been the subject of academic interest.
Chevapatrakul, Mizen, and Kim (2003) argue that the MPC does not follow simple ‘‘Taylor-
style’’ rules when setting monetary policy; rather, it uses a broad set of information variables
when making a decision. With the use of ordered probit analysis, Gascoigne and Turner (2004)
find evidence that the MPC’s reaction function is asymmetric. Besley, Meads, and Surico (2008)
show that although MPC decisions are marked by voter heterogeneity, reactions to the
inflation forecast and output gap are not significantly different on the basis of a member’s type
and career experience. Finally, Goodhart (2005) suggests that the inflation and real output
growth forecasts published in the Bank’s quarterly Inflation Report are not those of most
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Members from Reserve Bank Presidents. Because MPC votes are modeled as a function of the economic environment,
this paper is perhaps closest to Tootell (1991), who tests but fails to find evidence to support the hypothesis that
Federal Reserve Bank Presidents vote more ‘‘conservatively’’ than Board Governors. Put another way, Board
Governors and Bank Presidents share the same reaction functions.
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relevance in explaining the MPC’s policy decisions, in that they are conditioned on the interest
rate prevailing after the policy decision has been taken (i.e., they are ex post forecasts). To
overcome this problem, Goodhart constructs a series of ex ante forecasts that are closer to the
ones on which policy decisions are based. Reaction function estimates with the use of this data
suggest that the MPC acted aggressively to deviations in inflation from target. Given
Goodhart’s experience as an MPC member, his argument has particular saliency. His approach
is revisited in the construction of the variables used in estimation.
Finally, with respect to the UK monetary policy framework, the classification of monetary
policy committee types by Blinder (2007) into autocratically collegial, genuinely collegial, and
individualistic varieties has particular saliency. According to this typology, the Bank of England
MPC emerges as being individualistic, attributable to the fact that during the course of
meetings, unanimity is neither necessarily expected nor sought, and members ‘‘not only express
their own opinions verbally, but probably also act on them by voting’’ (Blinder 2007, p. 119).
The influence of the chairman is thus identified as being less pronounced than for collegial
committees (such as the FOMC and the European Central Bank Governing Council), wherein
the role of the chairman in shaping decisions is deemed much greater. With respect to the
typology of committees outlined above, Gerlach-Kristen (2008) is notable for extending the
work of Blinder (2007) to a more formal setting, with emphasis on the role of the chairman.
3. MPC Framework and Policy Performance
The MPC is structured as follows: Five members are chosen from within the ranks of Bank
staff, hence the name insiders. Three of these members serve five-year terms, namely theGovernor
of the Bank and two Deputy Governors. The remaining two insiders are chosen by the Governor
and serve three-year terms. These individuals have traditionally been the Chief Economist and the
person responsible for monetary operations. Therefore, when the Governor appoints Bank staff
to these positions, he is effectively choosing who he wants to sit on theMPC.6 The remaining four
members are chosen from outside the ranks of Bank staff—hence the name outsiders—and are
appointed directly by the Chancellor of the Exchequer. In this sense, outsiders cannot be viewed
as Bank ‘‘representatives,’’ typically being chosen from the private sector and academia.
Outsiders serve three-year terms. All members’ terms are renewable. Monetary policy is
determined monthly by simple majority rule after a vote on the interest rate tabled by the
Governor, who chairs the MPC. In the event of a split decision, the Governor has a casting vote.
In terms of inflationary performance, the MPC met its objectives during its first nine
years. The general trend was for the interest rate to fall, and inflation as measured by the both
the Retail Price Index excluding mortgage interest repayments (RPIX) and the Consumer Price
Index (CPI) remained low and stable. Indeed, both RPIX and CPI inflation remained close to
their respective target rates of 2.5% and 2% (the 2.5% year-on-year increase in RPIX inflation
was the adopted target between June 1997 and December 2003. Thereafter, the MPC was
required to hit 2% year-on-year CPI inflation). On no occasion did the inflation rate deviate by
more than one percentage point either side of its target rate, which would have required the
Governor to write an open letter to the Chancellor expounding both the causes and expected
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duration of the deviation and the measures the MPC would adopt to bring inflation to target.
The interest rate was raised, lowered, and left unchanged on 14, 17, and 78 occasions
respectively, reflecting the inertial nature of monetary policy. When policy did change, it is
hallmarked by what might be referred to as policy gradualism: Rates are changed upward or
downward in a series of small steps rather than fewer relatively larger ones. Furthermore, the
MPC is most likely to change the interest rate during months in which the quarterly Inflation
Report is released: Of the 31 meetings during which rates were changed, 12 took place during
these months, 11 took place in the month immediately following its release, and 8 occurred in
the month thereafter. Interest rate changes greater in magnitude than 25 basis points are also
most likely to be made during an Inflation Report month: Only four such changes were made
(all 50 basis point reductions); three of these occurred in Inflation Report months and one in the
month immediately thereafter. Its publication is thus a significant event because it contains the
findings of the most recent full forecasting round, the results of which are embodied in the
MPC’s quarterly inflation and output projections (see, e.g., Budd 1998). Further discussion of
the role it plays in shaping member’s policy choices is given in section 5. Group policy choices
are now compared.
4. Insiders versus Outsiders: Group Policy Choices
The level of interest rates chosen by insiders and outsiders in MPC meetings is first
examined—in particular, the suggestion that the former group are comparatively more hawkish
on interest rates.7 Figure 1 plots the differences in the mean and median interest rates chosen by
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Figure 1. Differences in mean and median chosen group interest rates, Insiders versus Outsiders
7 Treasury Select Committee Minutes of Evidence (Q79), Monday, June 16, 2003.
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both groups. Measured in basis point units, the line labeled ‘‘Mean difference’’ is obtained by
subtracting the mean interest rate cast by outsiders at each MPC meeting from that cast by
insiders, whereas ‘‘Median difference’’ is calculated with the use of the median interest rate
associated with each group. Post-May 1998, insiders are generally characterized by higher mean
and median interest rates.8 The median difference varies by as much as 25 basis points in
magnitude, as does the mean difference. A natural interpretation of this finding is that,
compared with insiders, outsiders believe that relatively lower interest rates (or, one may
conjecture, lower interest rate paths) are consistent with hitting target inflation. This begs the
question of why outsiders systematically choose lower interest rates. In light of previous
sections, perhaps the most plausible explanation is that outsiders use different information sets,
have different models of the economy, or both (e.g., Wadhwani 2002).9
As shown in Table 1, insiders were in agreement with each other more so than outsiders.
The overwhelming majority of MPC meetings (79) were marked by insiders sharing a single
view on the immediate policy decision (i.e., voting unanimously as a group). For outsiders,
although the majority of meetings were hallmarked by the presence of a single view (57
meetings), almost half were characterized by the presence of two or more (52 meetings). Such
behavior is consistent with the prediction that insiders have a greater tendency to vote as a bloc
(Buiter 1999; Gerlach-Kristen 2003). On average, insiders were on the winning side of a
monetary policy decision 91.1% of the time, compared with 78.5% for outsiders. Put another
way, insiders are far less likely to dissent than outsiders. This finding can be explained in terms
of the in-built 5–4 majority insiders command over outsiders: On the basis of previous
arguments, if insiders vote together because of (i) career concerns and (ii) a ‘‘Bank’’ consensus,
their institutional majority will lead to them being on the winning side of a decision. Reaction
function estimation is now turned to.
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9 The fact that outsiders choose systematically lower interest rates than insiders also raises the question of whether the
Chancellor of the Exchequer appoints outsiders on the basis of their being doves (see Dornbusch, Favero, and Giavazzi
[1998, p. 25] for similar sentiments with respect to European Central Bank Governing Council appointments). An
important caveat worth noting in relation to this possibility is that appointing doves does not imply appointing
members who opportunistically vote to increase output with no regard for hitting the inflation target: that is, it is
possible to be a dove and target inflation as a primary objective (for reasons listed above). Moreover, it makes no sense
for the Chancellor to purposely appoint MPC members who would systematically undermine the monetary policy
objectives of his own Government. If the Government wanted to appoint members based on their being doves, Mervyn
King would arguably not have been chosen as a successor to Eddie George: Before his appointment to Governor, King
cast more dissents on the side of monetary tightness than any other MPC member and no dissents on the side of
monetary ease, making him the most ‘‘hawkish’’ member of the MPC in its first five years.
Table 1. Extent to Which Internal and External Members Agree with Themselves, June 1997–
May 2006
No of Views Held at Each Meeting
No. of Meetings
Insiders Outsiders
1 79 57
2 30 51
3 0 1
8 Given that the population only contains 11 insiders and 11 outsiders, it was deemed necessary to determine whether a
few accidental draws might be driving the results. All calculations (and regressions in future sections) were also
performed with the simultaneous omission of Mervyn King (insider) and DeAnne Julius (outsider) from the sample.
Results obtained were qualitatively similar.
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5. Model and Data
Following Tootell (1991, 1996), Dolado, Maria-Dolores, and Naveira (2005), and, more
recently, Brooks, Harris, and Spencer (2007), limited dependent variable analysis is employed
to model interest rate decisions and, more specifically, the propensity of insiders and outsiders
to change rates. As noted in the latter two contributions, the pattern of short-term interest rate
movements associated with modern monetary policy making makes limited dependent variable
analysis particularly apposite: When rates are moved, they are typically done so in fixed
intervals of 25 basis point multiples. This empirical regularity also extends to members’
individual votes.
Assuming that policy choices facing members have an implicit ordering makes ordered
probit analysis a natural choice to model voting behavior. Write the general model as
ygt ~ x’gtbz egt , ð1Þ
ygt ~ 1 if y

gt ƒ c1
ygt ~ 2 if c1 v ygt ƒ c2
..
.
ygt ~ J { 1 if cJ{2 v ygt ƒ cJ{1
ygt ~ J if y

gt w cJ{1,
ð2Þ
where ygt corresponds to member g’s vote (j 5 1, 2, . . . , J) in period t. xgt is a 1 3 h vector
containing h covariates capturing the information sets of MPC members at the time each vote
was cast, and b is a 1 3 h vector of parameters. c1, c2, . . . , cJ–1 are the respective cutpoints.
Unlike the linear probability model, marginal effects are computed by holding regressors at
predetermined values, vary across choices, and sum to zero across outcomes. A member’s
policy response at a given meeting, Digt, is measured in basis point units such that
large decreaseð Þ ygt ~0
small decreaseð Þ ygt ~ 1
no changeð Þ ygt ~ 2
small increaseð Þ ygt ~ 3
u Digt v{25,
u{25~ Digt,
u Digt~ 0, and
u 0v Digt:
ð3Þ
Given a member’s vote can be classified into one of four categories (J 5 4), this implies three
cut points. Figure 2 plots the distribution of members’ responses according to the above
ordering.10 Outsiders are less policy-inertial than insiders (56.1% vs. 67.6% for no change), are
more likely to opt for rate reductions, but are less likely to raise rates. These findings are
consistent with the tendency for outsiders to vote for lower rates, as depicted in Figure 1.
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10 Over the sample period, the actual policy rate was never adjusted in increments other than 250, 225, 0, and 25 basis
points. This finding extends to the individual votes of all MPC members other than Willem Buiter, who cast three
votes favoring a 75 basis point reduction and one favoring a 40 basis point change in the same direction. These votes
are included in the ygt 5 0 category, in which all remaining votes are for 50 basis point reductions. The same member
also cast a single vote favoring a 50 basis point rise, which is included in the ygt 5 3 category (all other votes being 25
basis point increases).
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To compare both groups, reaction functions are estimated separately for insiders and
outsiders and geared to the view that the MPC changes interest rates using a simple rule
analogous to Taylor (1999): Indeed, subject to maintaining price stability, a secondary objective
of monetary policy is ‘‘to support the economic policy of her Majesty’s Government, including
its objectives for growth and employment’’ [Part II, Section 11 (Objectives) of the Bank of
England Act 1998]. Together, the primary and secondary objectives can be interpreted as a
Taylor-style monetary policy rule. However, a principal difference between the approach here
and that of much of the reaction function literature is that our specification is expressed in
terms of interest rate changes, as opposed to levels.
Forecast-based measures of output growth and inflation were used to construct Taylor-
type covariates: Specifically, the MPC’s in-house modal inflation and output projections—as
published in the quarterly Inflation Report—were utilized.11,12 Implicit to this approach is the
view that in any month, MPC members base their policy choices on the most recently available
constant (as opposed to market-based) projections. In the process of constructing our
covariates, the published forecast series for inflation and output were first modified following a
procedure proposed by Charles Goodhart (2005), who argues their ex post nature (i.e.,
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Figure 2. Distribution of members’ interest rate decisions, Insiders versus Outsiders
12 The Inflation Report is published in February, May, August, and November, meaning the information contained in
the MPC’s in-house forecasts cover three-month periods comprising either February, March, April; May, June, July;
August, September, October; or November, December, January.
11 Although the Bank’s in-house projections form a natural starting point for the choice of covariates, their quarterly
frequency was initially deemed potentially problematic for the purposes of estimation—this is because the MPC makes
policy decisions (and hence members cast votes) on a monthly basis. To address this issue, members’ votes were also
used to construct a quarterly voting series, which were then regressed on the quarterly data. Each regressand datapoint
quantified the cumulative policy response of each member, defined as the difference in the interest rate chosen by each
member in the second month after publication of the quarterly inflation report and the interest rate chosen by the
MPC in the month immediately prior to its publication. However, as an anonymous referee has pointed out, this
approach leads to a loss of voting information, making an analysis based on monthly series more desirable.
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conditioned on the interest rate prevailing after the policy decision has been taken) markedly
lessens their importance in explaining the MPC’s policy decisions: This is because, in practice,
MPC members react to ex ante forecasts (i.e., conditioned on the interest rate set by the MPC in
the previous month). With the use of published ex post modal forecasts, proxy ex ante forecasts
were constructed that are potentially much closer to those on which interest rate decisions are
based.13 These modified forecasts were then interpolated by a cubic spline procedure: This
resulted in a monthly series characterized by a curve constrained to pass through the ex ante
forecast values in Inflation Report release months, with the property that, as the next Inflation
Report month approached, forecast values in the intervening months tended toward the new ex
ante forecast values. An appealing interpretation of this property is that MPC members
gradually revise a given set of quarterly and output inflation projections in the months after
their release (i.e., because of the arrival of new economic information over time and after policy
discussions with their peers and other Bank staff during the course of MPC and pre-MPC
meetings), such that their values move toward those contained in the subsequent set of
projections.14 The resulting series were expressed in deviation form—output growth minus
potential <(assumed to be 2.4% p.a.)—and the deviation of inflation from target. These series are
hereafter referred to as GAPt and pDev,t, respectively (it is assumed the forecast values in any
given period are the same for all members). Finally, a forecast horizon was chosen in line with
views expressed by the MPC (Monetary Policy Committee 1999) that interest rate changes take
two years to maximally affect inflation and approximately one year for output. It is noted here
that although additional regressions were estimated with the use of other Taylor-type
covariates—constructed from (i) monthly consensus forecasts of output growth and inflation as
published in Her Majesty’s (HM) Treasury’s Forecasts for the UK Economy, (ii) monthly
estimates of GDP and inflation corresponding to current economic activity, and (iii) the MPC’s
own inflation and output projections—none performed as well as GAPt and pDev,t. Our results
provide compelling support for the conjecture that, in practice, not only are the MPC’s
inflation and output projections clearly important in capturing voting behavior, but MPC
members are forward looking in their policy actions. For completeness, full results of all
additional estimations, along with more complete descriptions of the variables used, are
presented in the section on robustness checks in the Appendix.
Finally, in addition to the use of Taylor-type covariates to explain voting behavior, three
additional variables were included in the specifications: a dummy variable capturing the effect
of different MPC Chairmen (1 if King, 0 if George), hereafter denoted CHAIRt, and two
variables capturing the effect of past interest rate decisions and policy choices. Specifically,
these comprise a lagged change in the actual policy rate chosen by the MPC (hereafter denoted
D~it{1); and the difference between member g’s period (t 2 1) chosen policy rate and the MPC’s
period (t 2 1) policy rate (hereafter denoted Difft–1). This latter term captures the extent to
which a member disagrees with the winning majority of MPC members in the previous meeting.
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13 With respect to the choice of covariates, Besley, Meads, and Surico (2008) construct an inflation variable based on the
MPC’s modal projections (also conditioned on constant interest rates, as is the case here). Their output gap variable is,
however, constructed with the use of confidential Bank data.
14 In using the cubic spline procedure, it is noted that alternative interpolation methods were also considered by the
authors, particularly those based on the utilization of a monthly indicator series (for example, the Chow-Lin (1971)
procedure). However, the choice of an appropriate indicator for both output and inflation was not at all obvious.
Moreover, such a procedure would not constrain the resulting interpolated estimates to equal calculated ex-ante
values in Inflation Report months.
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A value of Difft–1 5 0 implies that a member casts an assenting vote, whereas a positive or
negative value indicates a (dissenting) vote to set a relatively higher or lower rate, respectively.
This yields a specification of the form
ygt~b0pDev,tzb1GAPtzb2D~it{1zb3Diff t{1zb4CHAIRtzegt , ð4Þ
which explicitly accounts for the effect of past voting behavior and past changes in the official
policy rate on present voting decisions. Moreover, estimates presented in the following section
indicate that such variables play an important role in explaining voting behavior.15
Estimation Results and Policy Response Profiles
All estimates are reported in Table 2 (total observations [obs] 5 927; insider obs 5 516;
outsider obs 5 411). In both specifications, coefficients on pDev,t are statistically significant
across both groups of members and markedly greater than those on the output gap, which,
although correctly signed, is insignificant for outsiders.16 Voting behavior does not appear to be
affected by the tenure of different chairmen, as evidenced by the statistical insignificance of the
CHAIRt dummy.
17 However, as mentioned previously, the effect of previous voting behavior
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15 We are grateful to two anonymous referees for helpful comments and suggestions with respect to the choice of
covariates.
16 All regressions were initially estimated with a dummy and interaction term to take into account the effect of changing
the inflation target from 2.5% RPIX inflation to 2% CPI inflation. Both variables were found to be statistically
insignificant and were subsequently dropped. An interpretation of this finding is that MPC members respond in the
same way to equivalent-sized deviations in both inflation measures from their respective target values.
17 The analysis was also extended to splitting the sample into time frames on the basis of the different committee chairs
(the insider-outsider split was maintained throughout). Although some evidence suggests that members responded
differently under different chairmen, it was still found that insiders and outsiders differed in their behavior in much the
same way reported in the main findings. However, because of the smaller sample size (and the associated loss of
degrees of freedom), some estimation problems were encountered, and it was felt that the results were not robust.
Table 2. Estimation Results—Bank Forecastsa
Variables Insiders Outsiders
pDev,t 6.00
*** (0.67) 5.70*** (0.72)
GAPt 0.42
*** (0.12) 0.18 (0.12)
D~it{1 1.49
*** (0.42) 1.78*** (0.46)
Difft–1 4.74
*** (0.79) 6.08*** (0.59)
CHAIRt 0.18 (0.14) 0.005 (0.16)
c1 22.38
*** (0.18) 22.67*** (0.20)
c2 21.22
*** (0.13) 21.01*** (0.15)
c3 1.61
*** (0.14) 1.49*** (0.15)
Summary statistics
AICb 714.658 633.848
BICc 748.627 665.997
log L 2349.329 2308.924
a Standard errors in parentheses.
b AIC, Akaike’s information criterion.
c BIC, Bayesian information criterion.
* Two-tailed significance at p , 0.1.
** Two-tailed significance at p , 0.05.
*** Two-tailed significance at p , 0.01.
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and past changes in the official policy rate appear to be significant determinants of voting
decisions. In all estimations, parameter estimates appertaining to D~it{1 and Difft–1 are larger
for outsiders, suggesting that the effect of past behavior and previous MPC voting decisions on
current voting behavior is more pronounced for this group. Likelihood ratio tests were also
conducted to test the hypothesis that all regressions should be estimated separately for insiders
and outsiders. The hypothesis was overwhelmingly accepted in every case (results available on
request), a result that adds to the weight of evidence in section 4 that a member’s type has a
significant bearing on MPC voting outcomes. However, to gauge the effect of a change in a
given covariate, marginal effects (MEs) need to be calculated for all four outcomes (ygt 5 0, 1,
2, 3). To make results between groups directly comparable (and to correct for differences in
sample means caused by the different sample sizes associated with both groups), MEs are
calculated across all specifications, holding all variables at zero, and are presented in Table 3.
For both groups of cohorts, the probability of changing the interest rate is most greatly
affected by deviations of forecast inflation from target and those variables corresponding to the
effect of past policy actions and voting behavior. Reassuringly, the MEs for increases and
decreases in inflation are correctly signed and, in all cases, statistically significant. This accords
with the view that a rise (fall) in forecast inflation above target level is likely to induce a
tightening (loosening) of policy. Although GAPt is only significant for insiders, it is nevertheless
correctly signed. The effects of a change in GAPt are small, a finding that reflects the small
parameter estimates corresponding to this variable.
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Table 3. Marginal Effects—Bank Forecastsa,b
Variable ygt Insiders Outsiders
pDev,t 0 20.14
** (0.06) 20.06* (0.04)
1 21.00 (0.19) 21.30*** (0.24)
2 0.48*** (0.30) 0.61* (0.35)
3 0.66*** (0.14) 0.75*** (0.17)
GAPt 0 20.01
* (0.01) 20.002 (0.002)
1 20.07*** (0.03) 20.04 (0.03)
2 0.03 (0.03) 0.02 (0.02)
3 0.04*** (0.01) 0.02 (0.02)
D~it{1 0 20.03
** (0.02) 20.02* (0.01)
1 20.25*** (0.08) 20.40*** (0.11)
2 0.12 (0.08) 0.19* (0.11)
3 0.16*** (0.06) 0.23*** (0.08)
Difft–1 0 20.11
** (0.05) 20.07* (0.04)
1 20.79*** (0.18) 21.38*** (0.22)
2 0.38 (0.24) 0.65* (0.36)
3 0.52*** (0.13) 0.80*** (0.19)
CHAIRt
c 0 20.003 (0.003) 20.00006 (0.002)
1 20.03 (0.02) 20.001 (0.04)
2 0.01 (0.01) 0.0005 (0.02)
3 0.02 (0.02) 0.0007 (0.02)
a Standard errors in parentheses.
b Marginal effects calculated holding all variables at 0.
c CHAIR is evaluated as the discrete change of the Chairman dummy from 0 to 1.
* Two-tailed significance at p , 0.1.
** Two-tailed significance at p , 0.05.
*** Two-tailed significance at p , 0.01.
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Yet only calculating the MEs is in some respects not entirely satisfactory for the purposes
of this paper because their values are typically unique to the predetermined values at which
covariates are held; put another way, the calculated change in probability associated with a
given voting outcome is at best only accurate for very (ideally infinitesimally) small changes in a
covariate.
Therefore, whilst the convention of reporting MEs is adopted, understanding the behavior
of each group is enhanced by the inclusion of their policy response profiles. Displayed in
Figure 3, these show the course of action most likely to be adopted by each group across
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Figure 3. Policy response profiles for Insiders and Outsiders under different policy scenarios
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different CPI forecast values on the basis of the ordering identified in Equation 3;18 here, the
most likely voting response corresponds to the range of CPI values over which the probability
of each outcome occurring (j 5 0, 1, 2, 3) is highest.
For the four outcome case, and in keeping with Equation 3, policy responses are denoted
as follows: 0* (large decrease), 1* (small decrease), 2* (no change), and 3* (small increase).19
Figure 3 contains two charts, in each of which the upper horizontal bar identifies the 2%
inflation target and the two lower bars depict the most probable policy responses for outsiders
and insiders, respectively. With respect to both charts, it is notable that members of each group
differ in their propensity to change interest rates, supporting the view that insiders and
outsiders differ in their voting behavior. Moreover, the range of inflation forecast values over
which members’ policy responses are distributed is within the ‘‘acceptable’’ range of inflation
outcomes stipulated in the MPC’s remit (1–3% for CPI inflation), values outside of which
trigger an open letter to the Chancellor. Indeed, for both groups of cohorts, policy responses
are distributed across a relatively small range of CPI forecast values; and, although the size of
output deviations predicted to trigger rate increases and decreases (not shown here) typically lie
well outside the range of in-sample values (minimum value 5 21.565; maximum value 5 0.98),
this is not the case for policy responses appertaining to pDev,t (minimum value 5 20.29,
maximum value 5 0.27).
The top chart in Figure 3 illustrates voting responses across different CPI forecast values,
assuming that the actual policy rate chosen by the MPC in the previous meeting was left
unchanged (D~it{1 ~ 0) and, furthermore, that an assenting vote was cast (Difft–1 5 0). Here,
outsiders are generally seen to require smaller deviations from target inflation in either direction
to trigger an increase or decrease in the interest rate. In this sense, outsiders react more
aggressively with respect to deviations of (forecast) CPI inflation in their pursuit of target
inflation. This also reflects the empirical regularity that insiders are more likely to vote for no
change in the interest rate.
The estimated coefficients on D~it{1 and Difft–1 also imply that past policy rate changes
and dissents have a more pronounced effect on the tendency for outsiders to vote for a rate
change. This finding reflects the larger coefficient sizes for these variables associated with this
group of cohorts. Indeed, when the effects of a previous dissent or policy rate change are
examined in isolation (e.g., by setting Difft–1 5 20.25 and D~it{1 ~ 0 or Difft–1 5 0 and
D~it{1 ~{0:25), important conclusions can be drawn. First, a dissent on the side of monetary
ease (tightness) is most likely to lead outsiders to vote for a rate reduction (increase) in the
following period. Second, a reduction (increase) in the period t 2 1 policy rate is most likely to
lead outsiders to vote for a rate reduction (increase) next period. The lower chart in Figure 3
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19 In all profiles, responses to forecast inflation are calculated by holding the values of all other covariates at
predetermined levels (CHAIRt and GAPt 5 0, whereas other variables are set as outlined above) and numerically
recovering the range of forecast inflation values over which each outcome is most likely to occur. Because these
recovered values will be in deviation form, target inflation is then added to give the range of forecast values (shown on
the horizontal axis), to which each group is assumed to respond.
18 As estimates suggest, members prescribe the same policy response to equivalent-sized deviations in forecasts of CPI
and RPIX inflation from their respective target measures; only charts corresponding to CPI inflation (the current
target measure) are presented. Because the coefficients associated with the output gap are small—and in the case of
outsiders, insignificant—corresponding policy response profiles are not presented here. Such profiles show that
deviations in forecast output from potential lying well outside the sample range are required to trigger a vote to change
the interest rate.
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combines these effects, depicting the most likely policy responses after a 25–basis point decrease
in the period t 2 1 policy rate (D~it{1 ~{0:25) coupled with a dissenting vote cast on the side
of monetary ease (Difft–1 5 20.25). Clearly, outsiders emerge as being far more likely to vote
for a rate reduction across the range of CPI forecast values shown.
6. Discussion
The analysis confirms that the institutional status of Bank of England MPC members
has a significant bearing on their policy choices. Compared with outsiders, insiders are more
likely to choose higher interest rates, vote as a bloc, and feature on the winning side of
decisions. Ordered probit estimates indicate that each group is characterized by different
reaction functions: Outsiders are shown to respond more aggressively to positive and
negative deviations in inflation from target; additionally, the role of past voting behavior and
policy decisions is different across groups. Many of these results are in line with earlier stated
priors.
One question not yet touched on is whether such voting outcomes are desirable. As stated
in the Introduction, the existence of outsiders is justified on the grounds that policy meetings—
and by implication policy decisions—benefit from the presence of both Bank and non-Bank
views. In practice, outsiders bring alternative views to the table: Evidence of this is readily
found in the Minutes of MPC meetings and other written sources (i.e., Goodhart, 2001;
Wadhwani 2002). Frequently, though, insiders are seen to dominate MPC decisions. As has
been argued, this stems from their tendency to vote together as a group, coupled with their 5–4
institutional majority over outsiders. On this evidence, the structure of the MPC is somewhat
biased toward the policy choices of insiders. But is this necessarily a problem for the MPC? The
answer is potentially, yes.
The earlier notion that insiders vote together because of an organizational consensus is in
many respects equivalent to saying that insiders bring the same view to MPC discussions. This
runs contrary to one of the main perceived benefits of group decision making: that committees
make better decisions than individuals because of the diverse views brought to the group by
different members.20 Attributing insider bloc voting to career concerns is equally problematic:
Even if insiders share different views, they can be disincentivized from revealing or voting in
accordance with them. The benefits associated with a heterogeneous committee are hence
reduced.
The prospect of group consensus formation has led Willem Buiter (1999) to advocate that
the majority of Bank of England MPC members should not emanate from a single organization
such as the Bank. On this analysis, the design of the MPC might be viewed as fundamentally
unsound. One solution to this perceived problem is to reduce the number of insiders on the
committee, as proposed by Sibert (2006), who suggests decreasing their number from five to
three. This could in principle engender policy decisions that better reflect the diversity of views
outsiders bring to deliberations: By no longer commanding an institutional majority, insiders
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20 In addition to this perceived benefit, Blinder (2007, p. 121) argues that MPCs benefit from a ‘‘larger and more diverse
knowledge base, different decision heuristics, and a built-in system of checks and balances.’’
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would be unable to dominate decisions, as is current practice.21 However, the prospect of such
an innovation raises a well-founded (and obvious) objection: Despite its current design, the
MPC still met its policy objectives in its first nine years, so why ‘‘fix’’ the MPC if it is not
‘‘broken’’? However, if a central objective was to design a framework in which interest rate
decisions were not subject to a single group dominating policy decisions, the present framework
of the MPC is flawed, and the perceived benefits of committee decision making are not being
fully exploited.
Appendix: Robustness Checks
Regressions were performed with the use of a number of alternative monthly inflation and
output series; however, on the basis of Akaike’s information criterion, the Bayesian
information criterion, and pseudo-R2 goodness of fit measures, none performed as well as
GAPt and pDev,t. Monthly series constructed from (i) current monthly estimates of GDP and
inflation, (ii) monthly consensus forecasts of output growth and inflation as published in HM
Treasury’s Forecasts for the UK Economy, and (iii) the underlying output and inflation
projections used in the construction of GAPt
* and pDev,t were considered. Table 4 reports these
additional findings, wherein all output gap and inflation deviation measures are denoted GAPt
and pDev,t. Appealing to goodness of fit criteria and summary statistics, regressions that use
Taylor-type variables constructed from economic forecasts performed most favorably, with
those based on official Bank forecasts performing best.22
For (i), monthly GDP estimates were constructed from (current, nonforecast) GDP data
according to the interpolation procedure of Chow and Lin (1971), in which the monthly index
of industrial production was adopted as the indicator variable. The resulting series was then
smoothed with the Hodrick-Prescott filter to proxy for potential output, and an output gap
measure was constructed by calculating the differences in the monthly annual growth rates
corresponding to each series. For the inflation term, deviations in the contemporaneous rate of
inflation minus the corresponding target rate were used. Both the inflation and output variables
were lagged (by one month) to take into account the data available to the MPC at the time of a
decision. According to the reported estimates, inflation has no role (statistically insignificant),
although the output gap is significant and correctly signed. Finally, the lagged variables in both
specifications are highly significant for both groups of members, a result that holds irrespective
of the choice of Taylor-type covariates. Of particular interest is the finding that in all but one
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21 The finding that outsiders have a greater propensity for changing rates is of some interest in relation to this conjecture.
Would, for example, an outsider-dominated MPC set policy characterized by more frequent rate changes? This may
not necessarily be the case. Whilst it is plausible to infer that under such a structure rates would be lower, outsiders’
greater propensity to vote for change may merely reflect their attempts to put the economy on a lower interest rate
path, which if realized might exhibit no less policy inertia than the (higher) path observed under an insider-dominated
committee. Further, reducing the number of insiders would render them less able to exploit their ‘bloc vote’, leaving
them more vulnerable to being on the losing side of decisions. This may ultimately manifest itself in insiders voting to
change rates with a higher frequency than outsiders (i.e., to put the economy back onto their ‘preferred’ higher interest
rate path).
22 Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000) assert that forecasts ‘‘. . . allow the central bank to consider a broad array of
information (beyond lagged information and output) to form beliefs about the future condition of the economy, a
feature which . . . [is] highly realistic’’ (p. 151).
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set of estimates (Current activity), the coefficients corresponding to D~it{1 and Difft–1 are
greater for outsiders.
In the case of (ii), for each month the average of 12-month-ahead GDP (growth)
consensus forecasts minus potential (assumed to be a growth rate of 2.4% p.a.) and the
difference between 12-month-ahead consensus inflation forecasts and the target rate were
used.23 Again, these variables were lagged (in this case by one month) to take into account the
forecast data available to the MPC at the time of a decision. Forecast variables for GDP
growth and inflation were obtained from HM Treasury’s Forecasts for the UK Economy.
Published monthly, this is a compendium of forecasts produced by city and independent
forecasters. Here, it is noted that although the Bank of England’s quarterly inflation and GDP
projections are purportedly central to interest rate decisions, the Inflation Report and Minutes
of MPC Meetings also make reference to consensus forecasts. For estimation purposes, the
average of new inflation and output forecasts reported in a given month were used (over the
course of the sample, forecasts from more than 50 city institutions and 20 independent
forecasters were used). As noted, although these regressions out-performed those based on
contemporaneous variables, they did not perform as well as those based on official forecasts.
Furthermore, although output (correctly signed) has a role, deviations from target inflation are
insignificant. Like the regressions based on current economic conditions, the role of the
Chairman is found to be significant, although only marginally. This is not the case for estimates
based on the MPC’s inflation and output projections, which are now turned to.
With respect to (iii), three results are notable. First, estimation results support the finding
in Goodhart (2005) that MPC decisions are better modeled by ex ante and not ex post forecasts
(estimates not presented here because of space constraints). Second, the preferred series
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Table 4. Additional Estimation Resultsa
Variables
Current Activity Consensus Forecasts
Insiders Outsiders Insiders Outsiders
pDev,t 20.19 (0.15) 20.14 (0.16) 0.39 (0.27) 0.48
* (0.29)
GAPt 0.22
** (0.09) 0.29*** (0.10) 0.92*** (0.13) 0.76*** (0.15)
D~it{1 3.18
*** (0.38) 3.13*** (0.42) 1.81*** (0.44) 2.11*** (0.48)
Difft–1 4.97
*** (0.76) 6.21*** (0.57) 4.45*** (0.77) 5.94*** (0.58)
CHAIRt 20.32
*** (0.12) 20.34** (0.13) 20.23* (0.12) 20.27 (0.13)
c1 22.36
*** (0.16) 22.67*** (0.18) 22.65*** (0.18) 22.85*** (0.20)
c2 21.42
*** (0.12) 21.25*** (0.13) 21.61*** (0.13) 21.35*** (0.14)
c3 0.99
*** (0.11) 0.98*** (0.13) 0.93*** (0.11) 0.91*** (0.13)
Summary statistics
AICb 836.143 710.940 794.725 694.329
BICc 870.174 743.128 828.755 726.517
log L 2410.071 2347.470 2389.362 2339.165
a Standard errors in parentheses.
b AIC, Akaike’s information criterion.
c BIC, Bayesian information criterion.
* Two-tailed significance at p , 0.1.
** Two-tailed significance at p , 0.05.
*** Two-tailed significance at p , 0.01.
23 Full details of how the 12-month-ahead forecast variables were constructed are available from the authors on request.
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modified a` la Goodhart (2005) and subsequently interpolated with the cubic spline procedure
outperforms regressions that assume MPC members only respond to the most recent quarterly
ex ante forecast in any given month. For example, if the ex ante modal inflation forecast is
calculated as 1.9% for the February Inflation Report, this is the value members are assumed to
base their voting decisions on in the following two months, until the release of the new forecast
in May, and so on. It is an approach that amounts to saying that in the two months following
the release of the MPC’s quarterly inflation and output projections, members do not base their
voting decisions on any new information. Regressions with variables constructed according to
this assumption are labeled Bank ForecastsG, wherein, as in the preferred model, output gaps
are constructed by assuming that the level of potential output is 2.4% p.a. Third, as an
alternative approach to cubic spline interpolation, Goodhart’s (2005) method was further
extended to construct a ‘‘monthly ex ante’’ series whereby for any given month (as opposed to
only the month in which the new quarterly forecast is published), the most recent set of in-house
forecasts were conditioned on the interest rate set the previous month (Bank ForecastsM). This
implies that if, for example, official rates are adjusted in the second and third months after the
release of the Inflation Report, the original ex ante forecasts are further adjusted to reflect these
changes. Although this approach is intuitively appealing, summary statistics indicated it
explained MPC voting behavior less satisfactorily than when Bank ForecastsG were used. In
many respects, this finding might be seen as reinforcing Budd’s (1998, p. 1790) assertion that
revisions to the MPC’s forecasts in non–Inflation Report months are no substitute for the
‘‘complete reassessment of all the evidence that is involved in a full forecasting round.’’
However, the interpolated forecasts in turn out-performed Bank ForecastsG, providing a more
mixed message. Yet ultimately, when considered as a whole, the estimation results presented in
this paper highlight the clear importance of the Bank’s in-house forecasts as determinants of
voting behavior.
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